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The classic political economy of trade models state behavior on the international plane by reference to 
the formation of domestic interests. Voters, interest groups and politicians are rational actors in this 
model, pursuing their economic preferences without cognitive or motivational distortions. This article 
questions the sufficiency of the rational choice model in the formation of contemporary trade policy. 
Starting from the classic political economy story, this article explores real world deviations from 
rationally expected outcomes by drawing on cognitive psychology. Using both theoretical and empirical 
analysis, we seek to identify key distortions that can better explain voter and politician behavior in the 
current trade wars. We begin with loss aversion in that individuals have asymmetrical attitudes towards 
gains and losses. Rising inequality within the rich world amounts to a perceived relative loss particularly 
for middle-class citizens. Combined with the absolute rise of equality between countries, this can trigger 
a double loss frame – both as an individual loss and a national loss – that can profoundly shape anti-
trade preferences in certain countries. Framing trade as a security threat also invokes powerful hawkish 
biases. Lastly, the availability bias can be provoked by social media mechanisms making people tend to 
focus on particular risks and overweight their import. 
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State behavior to foreign trade is traditionally explained by rationalist approaches, assuming a two-level 
game. The classic political economy account models the behavior of states or their governments on the 
international plane by reference to the formation of domestic interests within a given state. Endogenous 
policy formation treats interest groups (and sometimes voters) as participants in a competition for 
political favors, which are meted out by politicians pursuing their own self-interest. In particular, rational 
choice theorists emphasize the concentrated losses (and thus lobbying incentives) to import-competing 
industry in a shift towards a policy of freer trade. In contrast, the relatively minor benefits to individual 
consumers are unlikely to motivate those dispersed actors to bind together and lobby for a policy of free 
trade. On the other hand, firms that seek to export to foreign markets have inentives to lobby for 
liberalization. Voters, interest groups and politicians are viewed as rational actors in this model, pursuing 
their economic preferences without cognitive or motivational distortions. Trade policy is thus 
understood as an outgrowth of a political process that does not necessarily give rise to aggregate welfare 
maximization. 
This article questions the sufficiency of the rational choice model generally and in the formation of 
contemporary trade policy specifically. It is difficult to explain the trade-related aspects of BREXIT and 
the Trump Administration’s turn to destabilising tariffs in the guise of its “America First”1 policies 
purely on the basis of the rational voter paradigm. Rather, we propose to explore the added explanatory 
potential of behavioral economics and behavioral political economy. Although behavioural economics 
has revolutionized huge parts of economics, it is rarely used in the political economy of trade. Yet 
psychological experimental research shows that in contrast to the expected utility model based on 
material preferences used in economics and international relations theory, actors are only boundedly 
rational, and systematically have other-regarding preferences (both positive and negative). Decisions 
also depend on contexts and framing effects that depart from the rationalist axiom of “descriptive 
invariance.” Prospect theory in particular describes the manner in which people choose between 
probabilistic alternatives involving risk. Typically, decisions will vary depending on how circumstances 
are framed and presented, either as a positive or negative deviation from the status quo. Most 
fundamentally, individuals are loss averse with an asymmetrical attitude towards gains and losses. Loss 
aversion seems especially promising in understanding the impact of claims of trade deficits in shaping 
the Trump administration trade policies towards China and other major economic actors like the 
European Union. It is striking here that much of the debate on current trade and investment policy is 
framed around the security (and thus relative status) of some countries (especially the U.S vis-à-vis 
China) based on geopolitical shifts further triggering loss aversion. There are additional psychological 
kinks in rationality that are systematically substantiated by scientific experiments in cognitive 
psychology. For example, under the availability bias, people tend to think that risks are more serious 
when an incident is readily called to mind. Availability of information – such as the so-called “China 
shock” after the 2001 Chinese accession to the WTO and now the “Made in China 2025” announcement 
– can have broader cognitive effects on decisions. Of course, protectionist outcomes can disrupt supply 
chains and prove costly to consumers and/or workers, but the consequences are not immediately 
crystallised and thus might be neglected. 
                                                     
* We would like to thank Chad Bown, Jeff Dunoff, Bernard Hoekman, Andrew Lang, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Mark 
Pollack as well as two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and reactions. We are also grateful to José Reis 
and Betül Simsek for excellent research assistance. 
 This paper is forthcoming in a 2019 special issue on trade wars in the Journal of International Economic Law. 
1 See e.g. Trump Twitter: “In trade military and EVERYTHING else it will be AMERICA FIRST! This will quickly lead to 
our ultimate goal: MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!” of 23.05.2016, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/734742416494845952. 
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Starting from the political economy story of trade, this article explores real-world deviations of 
rationally expected outcomes by drawing on cognitive psychology. To be sure, protectionism is not a 
new phenomenon.2 But we are witnessing dramatic, even unprecedented, shifts in trade policies in some 
countries not seen since the Great Recession. We propose to explore the manner in which behavioral 
economics and psychology can offer a framework to better explain the drivers of the contemporary and 
sudden outbreak of protectionism. Beyond the contemporary setting, its insights may also more 
generally be applied to trade policy, explaining who is likely to support protectionism (not just those 
who lose in economic terms), why (including sociotropic preference formation and out-group hostility) 
and under what scope conditions loss aversion kicks in (not least rising inequality within countries and 
rising equality between countries). 
The article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we outline the classical political economy of trade policy 
based on the rational choice model and especially its key assumptions such as motivational rationality, 
the nature of utility gains and losses from freer trade (from the perspective of individuals) and 
amelioration of trade-induced dislocation effects (whether organically or through targeted policies). Part 
III then identifies a framework of select insights of behavioral economics which may be relevant for the 
formation of trade policy but call into question many of the underlying assumptions of the rational choice 
account. Part III also offers a targed discussion of the unit of analysis problem, as we shift beyond the 
state as a unitary actor. Part IV applies these general insights to the specific question of formation of 
current trade policy using both analytical tools and where appropriate, empirical data to contextualize 
and probe key claims (on questions such as the impact of framing and availability bias). Part V briefly 
defines scope conditions under which biases and heuristics may lead to protectionism, and makes 
preliminary suggestions on how international trade law might better take account of bounded rationality. 
II. Classical Political Economy of Trade Policy: Insights and Limitations of Public 
Choice Theory  
Many of the original legal constraints in international trade law can be understood through the prism of 
public choice theory.3 As a starting point, a public choice account of domestic regulation contests the 
notion that government is necessarily a benevolent maximizer (servant) of social welfare. Public 
officials are viewed instead as politically sophisticated actors pursuing rational (self-interested) agendas, 
especially the maximization of political support in order to increase their chances for re-election. Public 
choice theory places significant weight on the role played by interest groups in the formation of 
regulatory policy.4 In the trade context, theorists emphasize the concentrated losses that are incurred in 
a shift towards a policy of free trade. Import-competing industry has abundant incentives to lobby 
incumbent governments to entrench systems of trade protection in order to maintain market share. The 
concentrated job losses that flow from a move towards free trade in a given industry may also align 
labor interests with that of those industry groups seeking protection.5 In contrast, the relatively minor 
benefits to individual consumers, although huge in the aggregate, are unlikely to motivate dispersed 
consumers to bind together and lobby for a policy of free trade.6 With this collective action problem, 
domestic policy outcomes may systematically and disproportionately prioritize the welfare of the few 
(import-competing industry) over the welfare of the many (consumers in the importing state). Moreover, 
                                                     
2 Anne O. Krueger, 'Wilful Ignorance: The Struggle to Convince Free Trade Sceptics', 3 World Trade Review 483 (2004). 
3 Of course, there is also a long tradition in explaining economic nationalism in international political economy, see only 
Robert Gilpin, ‘The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations’, 25(3) International Organization 398 (1971). 
4 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, ‘Protection for Sale’, 84(4) American Economic Review 833 (1994), at 848. 
5 Robert Baldwin, ‘The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Perspectives of Economists and Political Scientists’ in Robert 
Feenstra, Gene Grossman and Douglas Irwin (eds), ‘The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish 
Bhagwati’ (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) vol. 1, pp. 147-175 at 162.  
6 Ibid. 
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a public choice account challenges a statist model of the formation of foreign economic policy. Under 
this static account, executive institutions and officials are understood as independent players in 
international settings, pursuing policies to serve national objectives with limited concessions to domestic 
political groups. Public choice theorists instead will argue that international relations on trade issues are 
best seen as a “two level game”7 involving simultaneous negotiations and concessions at both the 
intranational (between domestic interest groups and elected officials) and international (between 
governments) arenas.8 
Of course, other factors may impact the decisional calculus and tilt it in a direction at odds with what 
these various facets of public choice theory would predict. Trade protection may motivate domestic 
producers downstream (who incorporate the foreign good as an intermediate input) to become politically 
active against import barriers.9 That said, recent empirical evidence suggests a different causal direction, 
depending on levels of industry concentration. Supporting a theoretical model of “cascading 
protection”,10 that evidence suggests that granting trade protection to intermediate manufacturers leads 
instead to demands for protection by downstream users.11 Of course, not all industries are equally well 
organized. Domestic industries that are made up of a large number of small producers may have 
difficulty overcoming the transaction costs and free-rider problems associated with efforts to influence 
the political process.12 Yet generally speaking, public choice theory holds that there is a constant and 
structural bias towards protectionism in the formation of trade policy, at least for states whose political 
ordering allows for lobbying by organised and affected interests.13  
Trade agreements in turn enable a government to “tie its hands” in the face of such concerted 
lobbying by vested interests and give up its ability to grant protection to domestic goods (and their 
manufacturers).14 In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, quantitative restrictions on the 
import (or export) of goods are prohibited.15 Tariffs – taxes on foreign goods imposed at the border - 
were bound in schedules with members prevented from increasing these bound tariff rates.16 Moreover, 
                                                     
7 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 42 International Organization 
427 (1988), at 460. 
8 For the application of this theory in cooperative and noncooperative tariff-setting games, see Gene Grossman and Elhanan 
Helpman, ‘Trade Wars and Trade Talks’, 103(4) Journal of Political Economy 675 (1995).  
9 See Grossman and Helpman, above n 5, at 849 (noting that “the most serious political opposition to protection arises when 
higher prices stand to harm other producer interests downstream”).  
10 Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan, ‘Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy of Effective Administered Protection’, 
26(1) Canadian Journal of Economics 150 (1993); Michael P. Leidy and Bernard Hoekman, ‘Cascading Contingent 
Protection’, 36 European Economic Review 883 (1992). 
11 Drawing on trade remedy petitions over the 1988-2013 period, Ebahar and Zi find that for the U.S, “upstream protection 
leads to downstream petition for protection”. Interestingly, the authors replicated their analysis for the EU but found no 
such evidence for cascading protection suggesting that the critical difference is that in the EU (unlike the U.S) trade remedy 
investigations explicitly take downstream effects into account. Aksel Erbahar and Yuan Zi, ‘Cascading Trade Protection: 
Evidence from the U.S.’, 108 Journal of International Economics 274 (2017), at 289. 
12 Alan Sykes, ‘Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy’, 34 Journal of 
Legal Studies 631 (2005), at 647. 
13 The qualification here goes to authoritarian states organized on non-democratic lines. One might imagine that the leadership 
of such states is less likely to be influenced by the short-term views of a small number of affected domestic interests. But 
even here, some political scientists have suggested that such states are not entirely immune from political pressures. There 
is the argument that “such leaders must still be concerned about the possibility of losing political power through military 
coups, riots, and mass demonstrations touched off by policies unpopular with various economic and social groups”. See 
Baldwin, above n 6, at 159. 
14 For a political economy account where trade agreements are motivated by the desire of governments to commit vis-à-vis 
domestic lobbies, see Giovani Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare, ‘A Political Economy Theory of Trade Agreements’, 
97 (4) The American Economic Review 1374 (2007).  
15 GATT, Article XI. 
16 Ibid., Article II.  
Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz 
4 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
a further political economy dimension (designed to overcome the entrenched resistance of import-
competing industry) justifies this softer approach on tariffs vis-à-vis the hard ban on quotas. Their 
quantifiable and divisible nature made reduction relatively easy over time , an important dimension 
given the political importance of achieving a base level of reciprocity of concessions among the 
membership.17 It is important here to be mindful of the important role of trade agreements in mobilising 
export-orientated firms who will lobby for liberalization (if offered access to foreign markets) and 
thereby counter-balance the lobbying power of import-competing industry. A reciprocal exchange of 
concessions between states is therefore fundamental in convincing a variety of domestic interests of the 
overall benefits of trade liberalization.18 In successive and periodic negotiating rounds19, members 
would agree to reduce their tariff rates and any such reduction would then be required to be extended to 
all other member states via the most favoured nation (MFN) principle.20 
Generally speaking, domestic taxes and regulations are fully permitted in the GATT subject only to 
the (negative) condition that they are not protectionist devices that would distort the bargain on tariff 
reductions.21 Importantly then, this is a system that allows for significant heterogeneity in regulatory 
and redistributive conditions and experimentation including on questions of the adverse impact of trade 
liberalization. The flexibilities within the system enable GATT members, on first principles, to adjust 
their engagement with the system in times of significant political and societal pressure.22 In fact, John 
Ruggie has argued that the GATT’s bargain of “embedded liberalism” – with trade liberalization 
embedded against extensive flexibilities comprising a subset of shared social purposes among the 
membership – has been essential to the temporal resilience of state commitment to the trade law regime 
in times of pressure such as the onset of economic and political turmoil in the 1970s.23 Complementary 
accounts trace the impact of increased international interdependence in shaping the trade policy 
preferences of industries in this troubled period. Helen Milner argued that growth in exports and patterns 
of global intra-firm trade in the 1970s (with a focus on French and American industries) raised the costs 
of protection for internationally orientated firms who therefore resisted seeking protection even in that 
period of serious import competition.24 Given this historical backdrop and especially increased levels of 
interdependence in the global economy, it seems surprising that the contemporary period is characterised 
by such sharp resort to protectionism in some states. This naturally raises the question of the sufficiency 
of the explanatory value of classic economics and political economy in explaining the outbreak of 
protectionism in this turbulent period. 
From an economic perspective, there is a strong case for the constraints found on border protection 
in the trade law system, especially MFN treatment towards tariffs on trade in goods. The economic 
consequences of tariffs as a form of discriminatory border tax levied only on imported goods are well 
understood. Tariffs distort the working of the price mechanism with both global and domestic efficiency 
                                                     
17 Bernard Hoekman and Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 25-33.  
18 Robert Hudec, ‘“Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles 1 and III’, in Thomas Cottier, Petros 
Mavroidis and Patrick Blatter (eds.), Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000) vol. 1, 101-123 at 108-109.  
19 See Hoekman and Kostecki, above n 18, at 101-102. 
20 GATT, Article I.  
21 Under GATT Article III(1), internal taxes or regulations “should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to 
afford protection to domestic production”. These domestic policy tools if targeted at foreign goods can, of course, be simple 
substitutes for border (tariff) protection. Ibid., Article III. 
22 See generally Simon Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the WTO: A Law and Economics Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
23 John Ruggie, ‘Embedded Liberalism and Postwar Economic Regimes’, in John Ruggie (ed), ‘Constructing the World 
Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization’ (London: Routledge, 1998) 62-84. 
24 Helen Milner, ‘Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United 
States During the 1970s’, 41 International Organization 639 (1987), at 664. 
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implications. Different tariff discrimination amongst countries causes a shift in resources contrary to 
principles of comparative advantage. Demand for a given good dependant on the pricing mechanism 
shifts from efficient producers in a country subject to a high tariff rate to less efficient producers who 
are favoured by a low tariff rate. An MFN principle of equal tariffs for every foreign country provides 
for a more efficient allocation of resources than would be the case if discrimination is practiced.25 On 
an individual country level, the distortive effects of tariff discrimination are likely to lead to higher cost 
imports. An MFN policy allows a country to buy from the lowest cost and efficient supplier with 
consequent welfare-enhancing effects for individual consumers.  
Critically however, classical trade theory acknowledges that trade will yield losers within a state. 
Import competition may displace domestic industries and if so, some workers will lose their livelihoods. 
On first principles, the shift to (greater) liberalization cannot then be understood simply as one of Pareto 
optimality. In fact, the level of aggregate gains seems to become smaller as trade liberalization tackles 
progressively lower barriers. Rodrik has argued for instance that the “redistributive effects of 
liberalization get larger and tend to swamp the net gains as the trade barriers in question become 
smaller”.26 This seems to be borne out by recent empirical research, for instance, on the new U.S – 
Mexico – Canada Agreement (USMCA) which suggest that key provisions in the treaty will generate 
“modest aggregate gains in terms of welfare, mostly driven by improved goods market access, with a 
negligible effect on real GDP”.27 This then suggests that (gains from) globalization becomes politically 
more contentious in its more advanced stages. Yet economics alone cannot offer a rigorous justification 
of whether and how to compensate those actors that suffer losses from moves to freer trade. Instead, we 
are in the realm of normative perspectives or theories that would guide governments on what policies 
they should adopt in this context under some conception of right or wrong.28 To take one targeted 
example, a Rawlsian distributive justice claim would call for compensation to those adversely affected 
by trade liberalization, especially if they are in the most disadvantaged sections of society (such as low-
paid factory workers).29 Yet leaving aside those theories, self-interest of a sort may also justify 
compensation. From a classic political economy perspective, theoretically one can position 
compensation or mitigation techniques as a logical counter to intense lobbying by interest groups 
opposed to greater liberalization. The legal strictures of the GATT regime are in no way a constraint on 
such domestic policies of redistribution. And in fact, some countries, like the U.S, have long created 
positive adjustment programs targeted at trade-displaced workers.30 In Europe also, these sort of policies 
were introduced after the Second World War. With the creation of a common market for coal and steel 
in the European Coal and Steel Community, workers were able to benefit from ‘readaptation aid’. Aid, 
including extensive retraining programs, was granted to workers in the coal and steel sectors whose jobs 
were threatened by industrial restructuring. The European Social Fund, created in the early 1960s, was 
the principal weapon in combating unemployment.31 These though appear to constitute something of a 
minority as many states have seemingly banked on natural amelioration of the short-term adjustments 
                                                     
25 An alternative theoretical proposition would position trade law as restraining terms-of-trade manipulation. Yet even here, 
the goal is ultimately one of efficiency (at least in global allocation of resources). Donald Regan, ‘What are Trade 
Agreements for? Two Conflicting Stories Told by Economists, with a Lesson for Lawyers’, 9(4) Journal of International 
Economic Law (2006) 951-988. 
26 Dani Rodrik, “Populism and the Economics of Globalization”, 1 Journal of International Business Policy (2018), at 4. 
27 Mary Burfisher, Frederic Lambert and Troy Matheson, ‘NAFTA to USMCA: What is Gained?’ (IMF Working Paper No. 
WP/19/73, March 2019). 
28 Oisin Shuttle, Distributive Justice and World Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 37-48 (outlining 
different theories). 
29 Michael Trebilcock, Dealing with Losers: The Political Economy of Policy Transitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014) 68. 
30 Trebilcock, above n 29, at 78. 
31 European Community Information Service, Social Policy in the European Coal and Steel Community 1953-65, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/34501/1/A670.pdf (visited 14 May 2019). 
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costs as workers transitioned over the long-term to more competitive sectors of the economy. Strikingly, 
key international organizations have now taken up the distributional problem calling for greater targeted 
domestic policies to mitigate trade adjustment costs.32 To be sure, there are difficult (perhaps even 
intractable) design issues in constructing a specific adjustment mechanism to counter the negative 
effects (on workers) of trade liberalization, not least sticky issues of how to identify with some certainty 
those losers. Yet here too the public choice assumption seems to be that the concerns of workers (labor) 
are less likely to have the political traction of import-competing industry (capital) as an obstacle to free 
trade, sharpened by the decline in organised labor across the developed world (thereby limiting 
possibilities of collective bargaining).33  
It is important here to be mindful of the heterogeneity of the harm occasioned by trade-induced 
dislocation, and how it can slowly but inevitably acculturate over time into political demands. Generally 
speaking, adjustment of this sort has asymmetric effects based on age with younger workers 
experiencing relatively smaller costs vis-à-vis older workers. Aside from direct economic costs 
(including income/consumption foregone due to unemployment and adjustment costs of retraining to 
enable transition), there are hidden psychological costs of unemployment that must be borne in mind. A 
protracted period of unemployment can trigger physical and mental illness, family dissolution, anti-
social behavior (including through alcohol and drug dependence).34 In the absence of targeted or general 
support through a functioning social safety net, newly unemployed may seek employment at lower wage 
levels and in occupations of lower skill and labor productivity.35 This phenomenon then bleeds into 
growing patterns of income inequality across much of the developed world and political concerns of the 
social costs associated with economic globalization.  
III. Intervening: Bounded Rationality 
Since the 1970s, the assumptions underpinning the rational choice paradigm have been thoroughly 
challenged by psychological and economic experimental research. These findings have revolutionized 
huge parts of economics as well as the economic analysis of law. Economic tools like game theory or 
contract theory relevant to international trade law have been transformed by behavioral economics,36 
adding new insights in several issue areas of (economic) law and policy. But those insights remain in 
their infancy in political economy,37 including in the explanation of trade policy.38 There, research 
remains mainly focused on loss aversion.39  
                                                     
32 International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All The 
Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment (2017), available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/wto_imf_report_07042017.pdf (visited 9 September 2019). 
33 See Dani Rodrik, above n 27, at 7. 
34 On the adverse impacts of unemployment on life satisfaction, see Rainer Winkelmann, ‘Unemployment and Happiness’, 
94 IZA World of Labor 1-10 (2014).  
35 See Trebilcock, above n 30, at 67. 
36 For game theory, see Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003). For contract theory, see Botond Koszegi, 'Behavioral Contract Theory', 52 Journal of Economic 
Literature 1075 (2014). 
37 Jan Schnellenbach and Christian Schubert, 'Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey', 40 European Journal of Political 
Economy 395 (2015); Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman, Behavioral Law and Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2018) 393-409. 
38 For a non-rationalist account of investment policy using 'constructivist political economy' and focusing on uncertainty, see 
Jonathan Bonnitcha, Investment Wars: Contestation and Confusion in Debate about Investment Liberalization, in this 
special issue. 
39 Patricia Tovar, 'The Effects of Loss Aversion on Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence', 78 Journal of International Economics 
154 (2009); Caroline Freund and Çaglar Özden, 'Trade Policy and Loss Aversion', 98 American Economic Review 1675 
(2008). 
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Experiments are used to observe peoples’ social preferences and cognition under controlled conditions.40 
Many experiments show deviations from thin, cognitive rationality by demonstrating that individuals’ 
preferences often do not comply with the formal requirements of rationality. Furthermore, the 
assumption of thick, motivational rationality (especially purely self-regarding preferences) is challenged 
by the role that factors such as fairness, envy, and altruism play in people’s behavior. This enriched 
model strives to understand how people really behave.  
As a start point, a careful consideration of the relevant unit of analysis is in order when it comes to 
political economy.41 The relevant actors here are government (or politicians) as well as citizens and 
business (and their lobby groups). Generally, when applying behavioral economics to international 
relations42 or international law,43 the focus has been on state behavior as a unitary actor or on government 
leaders as individuals. Once we break up the “black box”, the insights from behavioral economics can 
be applied more easily. Here, four combinations are in principle possible. Bounded rational voters may 
encounter bounded rational politicians (and/or administrators),44 bounded rational voters may face 
rational politicians (who may exploit bounded rationality of the voters), rational voters may be 
confronted with bounded rational politicians and rational voters may combine with rational politicians. 
Of course, the latter combination is the basis for classical public choice theory, as well as the political 
economy story of trade and trade agreements. We will focus instead on bounded rational voters, in 
combination with rational or bounded rational politicians, and seek to identify the heuristics and biases 
which may impede the fulfillment of ideal preferences as postulated in classic public choice theory. 
Political psychologists have shown that citizens’ judgement and choices are deeply affected by the 
limitations on their ability to acquire, recall, and process information and are mostly determined by 
implicit attitudes and automatic reactions that they are not necessarily aware of, as well as by the 
interplay of affect and cognition.45 While we draw on this general research, our focus is especially on 
those biases that offer the greatest potential to explain the current outbreak of protectionist tendencies 
in different parts of the globe. Several biases and heuristics are particularly relevant to understand the 
political economy of trade through a behavioral lens. We focus on loss aversion (including the 
endowment effect), framing, the availability bias, so-called hawkish biases, and fairness.  
a. Prospect theory: loss aversion, reference points, endowment and the status quo 
While rational choice theory assumes that people perceive outcomes in absolute terms (expected utility), 
prospect theory posits that people ordinarily perceive outcomes as either gains or losses, rather than as 
final states.46 Gains and losses are defined in relation to some reference point, usually (but not 
invariably) the status quo or an entitlement. A loss counts more than a gain (loss aversion). Empirical 
estimates of loss aversion are typically close to 2, meaning that the disutility of giving something up is 
                                                     
40 They may be conducted in the field or in laboratory settings, and may assess individual or group behavior.  
41 Cf. Anne van Aaken, 'Behavioral International Law and Economics', 55 Harvard International Law Journal 421 (2014); 
Tomer Broude, 'Behavioral International Law', 163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1099 (2015). 
42 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and others, 'The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations', vol. 71, supplement S1 
International Organization S1 (2017); Rose McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations (Ann Arbor: 
Michigan University Press, 2004); James Davis (ed), Psychology, Strategy and Conflict (London: Routledge, 2013). 
43 Cf van Aaken, above n 43.  
44 Cf. for a behaviorally enriched public choice theory, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Cynthia R. Farina, 'Cognitive Psychology 
and Optimal Government Design', 87 Cornell Law Review 549 (2002). 
45 Generally, see Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, 2nd edn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
46 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under Risk', 47 Econometrica 312 
(1979); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty', 5 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 297 (1992); Jack S. Levy, 'Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical 
Applications and Analytical Problems', 13 Political Psychology 283 (1992). 
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twice as large as the utility of acquiring it. What counts as a loss or as a gain depends on the reference 
point. Mostly, the status quo is taken as the reference point and changes from this point are viewed either 
as losses or gains. But it can also be influenced by expectations which can in turn be influenced by 
envisaged prospects or entitlements. The reference point is also influenced by status of other people.47 
In the domain of gains, people exhibit risk aversion, whereas they are risk seeking in the domain of 
losses. 
b. Framing 
Closely connected to prospect theory but with further implications is the framing of decisions. Framing 
effects similarly violate a basic tenet of rational choice theory that individual preferences do not change 
from alternative ways of eliciting the same preference. A framing effect exists “when different ways of 
describing the same choice problem change the choices that people make, even though the underlying 
information and choice options remain essentially the same.”48 Many experiments explore those 
effects.49 The mechanism at work is that frames influence beliefs, and beliefs in turn influence 
behavior.50 Specific examples abound from framing ultimatum games51 as a product of resource scarcity 
generates higher offers and fewer rejections;52 framing negotiations as taking place in an international 
rather than a business context triggers more cooperative behavior;53 and framing a prisoner’s dilemma 
as a trust game can increase cooperation (and vice versa).54 It has also been explored in the political 
economy context, including studies of voting and public opinion, campaigns, policy-making and 
foreign-policy and a variety of other topics.55 The category of issue framing is especially important for 
our purposes. Issue frames focus on qualitatively different yet potentially relevant considerations. Issue 
framing effects refer to situations where by emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, 
a speaker leads individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions. In 
particular, describing a trade policy issue as a security issue may cause people to base their opinions on 
security threats instead of the trade implications of protectionist policies.56  
                                                     
47 See Zamir and Teichman, above n 39, at 45f. 
48 R. Cookson, 'Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments', 3 Experimental Economics 55 (2000), at 55; Tore Ellingsen 
and others, 'Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?', 76 Games and Economic Behavior 117 (2012), at 118 for 
different theories about framing. 
49 See Ellingsen and others, above n 50. 
50 Martin Dufwenberg, Simon Gächter and Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 'The framing of games and the psychology of play', 73 
Games and Economic Behavior 459 (2011). 
51 In this experiment, the proposer makes an offer of how to share a fixed amount, which the recipient can accept or reject. If 
the recipient rejects, both get nothing. In a homo economicus model, a proposer would offer the smallest monetary unit, 
and the recipient would accept it. Yet experiments do not obtain this result. 
52 Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003) 75. 
53 Richard J. Eiser and Kum Kum Bhavnani, 'The effect of situational meaning on the behavior of subjects in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game', 4 European Journal of Social Psychology 93 (1974). 
54 Generally, see Brian Skyrms, The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), experimentally, see Terence Burnham, Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith, ‘Friend-or-foe intentionality 
priming in an extensive form trust game’ 43 (1) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 57 (2000). 
55 James N. Druckmann, 'Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects', 
98 American Political Science Review 671 (2004). 
56 For a similar example based on experiments, see ibid. at 672. 
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c. Availability bias 
Another common cognitive blinder is the availability bias, which leads decision-makers to rely on 
examples and evidence that come immediately to mind. It is connected to the assessment of probabilities. 
Often, the estimated likelihood of an event and the frequency of its occurrence is based on ease of 
recalling similar events or occurrences.57 This bias results because peoples’ attention is more readily 
drawn to emotionally salient and easily recalled events, even ahead of objectively more likely and 
impactful events. Media play an enormous role in shaping this bias, including social media such as 
Twitter.  
d. Hawkish biases 
Many biases uncovered by psychological research favor hawkish decisions in conflict situations, 
including those described by prospect theory. The term “hawkish” denotes a propensity for suspicion, 
hostility and aggression, and for less cooperation and trust for the resolution of the conflict. Actors who 
are susceptible to hawkish biases are not only more likely to see threats as direr than an objective 
observer would perceive, but are also likely to act in a way that will produce unnecessary conflict. Many 
biases play a role in this distortion but we will deal only with those we deem especially relevant in the 
current trade context. Over-confidence (that is, the tendency of actors’ subjective confidence in their 
judgments to be reliably greater than the objective accuracy of those judgments), as well as the 
fundamental attribution error58 and the “illusion of control” (which is an exaggerated perception of the 
extent to which outcomes depend on one’s actions), tend to produce more hawkish decisions in 
international conflict situations. Actors subject to hawkish biases are mostly also overconfident in being 
able to “win” the conflict and they are in turn risk-seeking.59  
e. Fairness and Equity 
Experiments on social preferences - motivational factors - use game theory including the ultimatum 
game60 and the dictator game,61 which have been extensively deployed in different forms. Experimental 
research has shown that individuals are also motivated by other-regarding/altruistic and social 
preferences and have proven the purely self-regarding preference assumption of rational choice theory 
is flawed. The experiments thus suggest that rationalist theories may be faulted for neglecting, inter alia, 
                                                     
57 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability', 5 Cognitive 
Psychology 207 (1973). 
58 The fundamental attribution error denotes the tendency to attribute other people’s behavior to their personal attitudes and 
motivations, rather than to environmental influences and constraints; see for details Zamir and Teichman, above n 39, at 
Chapter 2. 
59 Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, 'Hawkish biases'in Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer (eds), American Foreign 
Policy and the Threat of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11 (London: Routledge, 2009). 
60 The experiments started with the so-called Ultimatum Game. See Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 'An Experimental 
Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining', 3 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 367 (1982). The proposer makes 
an offer of how to share a given amount (usually money) and the recipient can accept or reject the offer. In case of 
acceptance, the offered division is implemented; in case the recipient rejects, both get nothing. If the recipient is motivated 
solely by monetary payoffs, he or she will accept every offer. Therefore, the proposer will only offer the smallest money 
unit: this is expected by the homo economicus hypothesis but not found in the experiments. This is attributed to fairness 
considerations which are, when left unfulfilled, punished even if costly to the punisher.  
61 The “dictator” determines how to split an endowment (such as a cash prize) between himself and the second player. The 
second player simply receives the remainder of the endowment left by the dictator. Most people all over the world share 
the endowment, although there is no sanction for not doing so. This contradicts the rational choice assumption. For a meta-
analysis, see Christoph Engel, 'Dictator Games: A Meta Study', 14 Experimental Economics 583 (2011). For details, see 
Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt, 'The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and 
New Theories' in S. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier (eds), ‘Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity 
Vol 1’ (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006), 615-691. 
Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz 
10 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
altruism, spitefulness, and preferences for equality and the perceived intentions of the other players.62 
Indeed, people can be altruistic but they can also be spiteful. Behavioral insights in experimental games 
show punishment by other players takes place, 63 albeit costly to themselves, if there is a perceived 
violation of a norm (be it a fairness norm or a legal norm). 
Equity theory has explored the substantive fairness concerns of people. It focuses on determining 
whether the distribution of resources is fair to both relational partners. Individuals who perceive 
themselves as either under-rewarded or over-rewarded will experience distress, and this distress leads 
to efforts to restore equity within the relationship such as by decreasing their contributions or by quitting 
the relationship. Furthermore, psychological studies reveal that people care about fairness even when it 
is a odds with or unrelated to their self-interest.64 Yet, here another biases kicks in – the confirmation 
bias. It is the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information in a way that confirms one's 
preexisting beliefs or hypotheses.65 People also tend to interpret facts or norms in a self-serving manner, 
that is, they tend to take personal responsibility for desirable outcomes yet externalize responsibility for 
undesirable outcomes.66 
IV. A Behavioral Political Economy Approach to Protectionism 
As we have noted, the dominant approach to the study of international political economy assumes that 
the policy preferences of individuals and groups reflect economic self-interest (material preferences). 
Recent research has called this assumption into question by suggesting that voters do not have 
economically self-interested preferences about trade policy given that the economic consequences of 
protectionism and trade wars can be severe and economically costly for those who support it.67 One 
potential explanation is simple economic ignorance and this can indeed be shown: most voters do not 
understand the economic consequences of protectionism.68 But apart from ignorance, many other 
heuristics and biases uncovered by behavioral psychology are also at play. We now turn to explore the 
manner in which various behavioral insights, operating cumulatively, have explanatory potential for the 
contemporary outbreak of protectionism.  
                                                     
62 Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, 'Testing theories of fairness—Intentions matter', 62 Games and Economic 
Behavior 287 (2008); Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt, 'The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – 
Experimental Evidence and New Theories', in Serge Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds), ‘Handbook of the Economics of 
Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity Vol I’ (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006).  
63 For a discussion of the motives to punish, see Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, 'Driving Forces behind Informal 
Sanctions', 73 Econometrica 2017 (2005). 
64 J. Stacy Adams, 'Inequality in Social Exchange', 2 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 267 (1965); Zamir and 
Teichman, above n 39, at 102-104. 
65 Raymond S. Nickerson, 'Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises', 2 Review of General Psychology 
175 (1998). 
66 James Shepperd, Wendi Malone and Kate Sweeny, 'Exploring Causes of the Self‐serving Bias', 2 Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass 895 (2008). 
67 Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, Pinelopi K. Goldberg, Patrick J. Kennedy and Amit K. Khandelwal, The Return to Protectionism, 
Working Paper, available at http://www.econ.ucla.edu/pfajgelbaum/RTP.pdf (visited 23 July 2019), analyze the 2018 trade 
war on the U.S. economy. Imports from targeted countries declined 31.5% within products, while targeted U.S. exports fell 
11.0%. They find complete pass-through of U.S. tariffs to variety-level import prices. Annual consumer and producer losses 
from higher costs of imports were $68.8 billion (0.37% of GDP). After accounting for higher tariff revenue and gains to 
domestic producers from higher prices, the aggregate welfare loss was still $7.8 billion (0.04% of GDP). Whereas U.S. 
tariffs favored sectors located in politically competitive counties, retaliatory tariffs offset the benefits to these counties. 
They find that tradeable-sector workers in heavily Republican counties were the most negatively affected by the trade war. 
68 Sungmin Rho and Michael Tomz, 'Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?', 71 International 
Organization S85 (2017). 
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a. Inequality and Hegemonic Status: Loss Aversion 
Prospect theory and loss aversion have been best researched hitherto in the political economy of trade. 
It is puzzling for trade economists, assuming material preferences and their rational pursuit, to explain 
the deviation from their preferred model of utility gains. But some insights from behavioral psychology 
offer a contrasting account that challenges the centrality of key economic assumptions.  
Consider as a start-point that utility when it comes to free trade is largely one that flows from 
increased consumption possibilities. Yet psychological research has shown that employment has value 
for people over and above the purchasing power provided by the income people earn.69 The research 
plainly shows that people’s happiness and well-being is heavily influenced by their work satisfaction 
but much less by their income. As Kemp points out, “people derive benefits from their work which go 
beyond income or the consumption obtainable from this income, and which are not easily compensated 
for by income changes and adjustments”.70 Trade-induced job dislocation (loss) of the sort described in 
Part II or even the perceived likely prospect of unemployment can therefore generate significant 
psychological harm that, critically, may not simply disappear when people re-enter the workforce. This 
in turn limits the political traction to boundedly rational voters of empirical and aggregate claims made 
by economists such that reductions in employment in manufacturing from the “China shock” have been 
simply off-set by gains in employment in the services sector in the U.S.71 Voters tend to recall the loss, 
and to discount the off-setting gains. Since losses loom larger than gains, this may indicate that a pure 
off-setting is insufficient – suggesting that gains from trade would need to be twice as large as losses to 
convince loss averse citizens of the gains of freer trade. 
Relatedly, Patricia Tovar has used individual loss aversion to explain why a disproportionate share 
of protection goes to declining industries and why trade policy has an anti-trade bias. 72 She shows that 
if individual preferences exhibit sufficient loss aversion, higher protection will be given to sectors in 
which profitability is declining (at odds with the usual political economy notion that bigger and 
expanding industries would be in a better position to finance lobbying and therefore receive 
governmental support). She also shows that if the coefficient of loss aversion is large enough, there will 
be an anti-trade bias in trade policy. Furthermore, increasing anxiety that foreign commerce would harm 
people in the future (including leading to unemployment), even if it had not done so thus far, has been 
found to contribute to mounting opposition to trade among the American public.73 This seems to be 
explicable by the status quo bias of which every deviation is seen as a loss and leads to risk seeking 
behavior – given that protectionism and ensuing trade wars may lead to material losses for exactly those 
people who favor protectionist policies.74 Research also suggests that people who are influenced by the 
status quo bias are likely to oppose import liberalization even after controlling for each individual’s 
various characteristics, suggesting that neither income compensation nor insurance schemes are 
sufficient for expanding support for free trade.75 Narratives around trade can alone create expectations 
and when a trade treaty is concluded, the government would usually aggressively promote talk about 
                                                     
69 Simon Kemp, 'Psychology and opposition to free trade', 6 World Trade Review 25 (2007), at 28. 
70 Ibid, at 29. 
71 Bernard Hoekman and Douglas Nelson, Reflecting on populism and the economics of globalization, 1 Journal of 
International Business Policy 34 (2018), at 36. To be sure, China is only part of the story on the loss of manufacturing jobs 
in the rich world. For an account on waves of outsourcing , see Richard Baldwin, The Globotics Upheaval: Globalization, 
Robotics, and the Future of Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019). 
72 Tovar, above n 41. 
73 Edward D Mansfield, Diana C. Mutz and Devon Brackbill, 'Effects of the Great Recession on American Attitudes Toward 
Trade', 49 British Journal of Political Science 37 (2016). 
74 See above n 69. 
75 Eiichi Tomiura and others, 'Individual Characteristics, Behavioral Biases, and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a 
Survey in Japan', 24 Review of International Economics 1081(2016). 
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gains for all from the treaty. This, for example, happened with the conclusion of NAFTA.76 Since 
expectations can also create reference points, if the gains from trade are not realized for all this in turn 
may be perceived as a loss. Of course, there always losers from trade but the point here is that if gains 
are not reaped, this alone is perceived as a loss, even if the objective status quo remains the same. 
It is important to be mindful of the impact of patterns of rising inequality within the rich world 
(including the U.S) after a relative egalitarian distribution until 1980.77 Using an endowment effect or 
an entitlement and framing any deviation as a loss, can provoke loss aversion. The expected gain from 
globalization for all citizens may act as a reference point and if that gain remains unrealized, this would 
be perceived as a loss by the middle-class of the developed world. If voters feel that they are entitled to 
a certain economic status or they fear a deviation from the current status quo of their economic or social 
position, that may lead to loss aversion. Rising inequality amounts to a perceived relative loss within 
those countries (with the exception of the very rich). The anxiety of losing against the status of other 
citizens (which may act as a reference point) not only in absolute but also in relative terms, seems crucial.  
Importantly, the explanatory value of loss aversion goes beyond the specific impact of harm or 
perceived harm to individual voters. We can also position the status of other countries as a reference 
point in tracing a different type of loss aversion. Indeed, one experiment has shown that a shift in that 
sort of reference point can lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic 
options. While subjects would usually support candidates with less risky economic policies when their 
country was expected to do better than other countries, that changes once it was their country that was 
expected to do worse as they would then switch to candidates who propose riskier policy options.78 This 
seems to have clear resonance in the type of discourse on trade seen recently in the U.S. The U.S has 
clearly been a global economic superpower for a long period since the end of the Second World War. 
On some measures however, China is estimated to overtake the U.S somewhere between 2030 and 
2040.79 President Trump repeatedly used “Make America Great Again” as a campaign slogan in the 
2016 Presidential election which directly invokes loss aversion (great again, implying that it has lost 
out after being great).80 Consider how these repetitive rhetorical formulations on the relative status of 
the U.S as a country magnify and build upon localized anxieties felt by individual voters.  
The perceived loss due to the rising inequality within countries combined with the absolute rise of 
equality between countries, can trigger a double loss frame (particularly for the middle-class citizens of 
the rich world). This perceived individual loss and national loss can profoundly shape anti-trade 
preferences.  
                                                     
76 President Clinton at the signing ceremony said: “NAFTA will create 200.000 jobs in this country by 1995 alone”, see 
Youtube Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3ooMrgXido, at minute 2.06. “will promote more growth, more 
equality, better conservation of the environment”, at minute 1.27. 
77 Acundo Alvaredo and others, 'The Elephant Curve of Global Inequality and Growth', 108 AEA Papers and Proceedings 
103 (2018) and Christoph Lakner and Branko Milanovic, 'Global Income Distribution: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to 
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https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/07/25/na072618-chinas-economic-outlook-in-six-charts (last visited 25 April, 
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May 2018).  
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hsbc-says (visited 25 April 25, 2019). 
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b. Framing the Discourse on Trade Policy: Geo-economics and Security 
Research on the framing of trade policy preferences suggests that that material conditions associated 
with income and price effects are crucial, both in shaping trade preferences and in affecting the 
malleability of attitudes to issue framing. The results show susceptibility to political framing in policy 
debates.81 Furthermore, the impact of issue framing on individuals’ stated attitudes toward international 
trade have been found to be strong, especially among less educated people.82 Whereas negative framing 
evokes more protectionist sentiments, positive framing has no effect, unless it is underpinned by 
economists’ expert views.83  
Recently, especially under the Trump administration, trade has been prominently framed as a security 
issue and positioned in conflictual instead of cooperative terms. This reflects a sharp break from past 
understandings of the role of economic interdependence in decreasing conflict between states. Under 
the leadership of the U.S, the original framers of the GATT were motivated by the Kantian belief that 
economic isolation and state discrimination against private foreign actors engenders adverse political 
consequences resulting in political instability and irritation. By sharp contrast, a new conflictual frame 
has been deployed in the U.S which suggests trade now threatens national security not only in relation 
to China but also for aluminum and steel imports from a range of long-standing American allies like 
Australia, Canada and member states of NATO. Strikingly, the Trump Administration has even 
threatened to impose tariffs against car imports from the European Union suggesting these threaten 
national security. There is no legal basis for the claim made by the U.S to justify the imposition of these 
tariffs as has been confirmed given recent WTO Panel rulings on the scope of state autonomy to invoke 
security exceptions under the law of the WTO.84 But the legal position – hobbled in any event by the 
time delay in WTO dispute settlement coupled with the prospective nature of remedies in the WTO85 – 
is no counter to the turbulent manner in which the new security claim distorts trade policy dialogue and 
preference. Security is an especially forceful frame for shaping preferences as it can provoke immediate 
loss aversion. The framing of a “war” and China as an “enemy” can recast popular perceptions, as polls 
on public support for the government when at war tend to show people exhibit what they view as 
patriotism.86 Hawkish biases are typical in security and conflict situations and, if in a loss frame, 
individuals tend to make more risky choices. Actors who are susceptible to these hawkish biases are 
then likely to act in a way that will produce unnecessary conflict such as a trade war. 87  
These biases are likely to be magnified when we consider the impact, once again, of the relative 
decline of the U.S as a political and economic power. Some indeed argue that hegemonic stability theory 
is at play in what they have described as an “emerging geoeconomic world order”.88 Under this claim, 
                                                     
81 Martin Ardanaz, Victoria Murillo and Pablo Pinto, 'Sensitivity to Issue Framing on Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence 
from a Survey Experiment' 67 International Organization 411 (2013). 
82 Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik, ‘Why are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?’, 49 
European Economic Review 1393 (2005) (finding that pro-trade preferences are significantly and robustly correlated with 
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Framing', 60 International Organization 755 (2006). 
84 Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (WT/DS512/R), 5 April 2019), para. 7.82 (finding 
that action must be “objectively” found to fall within the security exception in GATT Art. XXI).  
85 Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘Editorial: Black Lies, White Lies and Some Uncomfortable Truths in and of the International Trading 
System’, 29 (2) European Journal of International Law 339 (2018), at 342. 
86 The “rally around the flag” phenomenon is well researched in political science, see William D. Baker and John R. Oneal, 
‘Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the 'Rally 'Round the Flag' Effect’, 45 (5) The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 661 (2001). We would like to thank one reviewer for this thought. 
87 See Kahneman and Renshon, above n 61. 
88 See especially in this special issue, Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes and Victor Ferguson, “Toward a Geoeconomic 
World Order”. 
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a hegemon like the U.S will support economic cooperation only where it does not fear the economic 
growth of strategic rivals. But when the relative size of the economies of the hegemon and its strategic 
rival converge to a sufficient degree, the hegemon’s sense of security diminishes and preference for free 
trade will weaken considerably. It is certainly true that the strategic choices of other states haves shaped 
and deepened the framing of trade policy in the U.S. In the run-up to the 2016 U.S presidential election, 
China publicly released its “Made in China 2025” blueprint of upgrading manufacturing capabilities of 
Chinese industries.89 From a Chinese perspective, that goal seems logical given China’s development 
trajectory and the importance of transitioning from labor-intensive industries in a way that avoids the 
so-called “middle income trap”. But that policy has dominated U.S trade policy discourse internally in 
a way that again portrays China as an existential threat to U.S technological leadership.90 Beyond general 
rhetoric, the specific intermingling of trade and security concerns in U.S political policy targeted, 
explicitly or implicity, against China has grown exponentially in the last few years from U.S export 
controls on emerging technologies (November 2018)91 to submission of Huawei on an entity list banning 
U.S companies selling to Huawei without government approval (May 2019).92 
At this stage, the reader might recall our focus on bounded rational voters in combination with 
rational or boundedly rational politicians. To a very large part, our analysis so far – especially on loss 
aversion – has focused mainly on constraints to rationality of individuals that can explain their voting 
support for protectionist outcomes. On the point of the security frame however, there is a live question 
of the rationality of the American political actor(s) responsible for the imposition of tariffs on security 
grounds. Of course, it could simply be that the Trump Administration is strategically using security to 
manipulate a boundedly rational voting population for their own political purposes. And indeed, the 
domestic legal mechanisms used to deploy the security tariffs (under section 232 of the U.S Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962) leave the U.S Executive relatively unconstrained from legislative oversight, 
naturally suggesting some sort of political expediency in their active deployment. None the less, these 
hostile beliefs have a longer genesis than the last U.S presidential election. Donald Trump, in particular, 
has had a historical view of trade as a zero-sum competition for resources between states that predates 
his election to the presidency.93 Relatedly, U.S Trade Representative Robert Lightizer’s has long 
supported aggressive unilateralism in trade policy and positively disdains multilateral political 
cooperation of the sort embodied in the WTO.94 Not surprisingly then, the Trump administration frames 
trade negotiations as business negotiations and as a zero-sum game with security aspects (thus further 
invoking loss aversion).95 This elicits less cooperation than framing it as an international negotiation.96 
Although we focus on bounded rationality of voters and do not take a view on the rationality of the 
Trump administration, it is plausible to assume that President Trump seems to be (over)confident that 
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https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1115578769518018560 
96 Cf. above n 56. 
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he can “win” the trade war invoking an illusion of control. He surely conveys a fundamental attribution 
error to the public, basically attributing the fault for the US trade deficit on the unfairness of its trading 
partners and the trade agreements concluded with them, insinuating that they are taking advantage of 
the United States,97 including technological advantage (especially China). 
c. China and Trade: Availability bias 
China and notions of unfair trade featured prominently on the campaign trail in the United States in the 
2016 U.S presidential election. Yet, the public association of China as a trade threat has a longer (though 
still relatively recent) lineage especially around Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001 and critically, it 
has gathered powerful momentum in media coverage over recent years. Autor, Dorn and Hanson have 
documented the large, persistent and highly localized labor-market disruption in the U.S from patterns 
of international trade flows from China over the period 1990 to 2007.98 But the tight media attention on 
issues surrounding trade with China has extended beyond this “China shock” of trade displacement in 
the U.S. The news media routinely features reporting on issues such as the “Made in China 
2025“ industrial strategy, select but high-profile Chinese economic interventions (such as purchase of 
the iconic Waldorf Astoria hotel in 2018)99 and most recently, the spread of China’s ongoing “Belt and 
Road” initiative.  
In the analysis below, we empirically explore how salient and available topics like trade, China, 
and/or tariffs are to the American public. We do so by focusing on possible mechanisms that can 
contribute to such salience, bearing in mind the powerful impact of availability bias in shaping voter 
perceptions on trade. We are particularly interested in presidential discourse and framing of trade 
disseminated either through traditional intermediaries or directly to voters through powerful new 
modalities of social media like Twitter. First, we can observe a sharp spike in the total number of 
monthly words dedicated to trade matters in The New York Times that coincided with much of the 
campaign leading up to the presidential election of Donald Trump on 8 November 2016. In fact, that 
sizeable focus has remained relatively constant in the years following the election of President Trump. 
Word count here is a better proxy for coverage of an issue than, say, number of articles as it captures 
greater length and depth of analysis including through investigative journalism. 
                                                     
97 See e.g. Trump Tweet: Europe has to pay their fair share for Military Protection. The European Union, for many years, has 
taken advantage of us on Trade, and then they don’t live up to their Military commitment through NATO. Things must 
change fast! 25.11. 2018, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1066790517944606721. 
98 David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson, ‘The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition 
in the United States’, 103 (6) American Economic Review 2121 (2013). 
99 Carl Ciovacco, The National Interest, Understanding the China Threat, November 29, 2018, 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/understanding-china-threat-37502 (visited 22 July 2019). 
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If we next turn to coverage of trade in State of the Union speeches, we can also observe that President 
Trump is significantly more negative in his sentiments on trade than any of his four predecessors. Given 
the limited time available for such a speech, whether a President praises or talks negatively about foreign 
trade, can be very revealing. POTUS speeches are also probative as they postdate an election campaign 
where, typically, newly elected presidents are more willing to offer a more balanced approach on 
complex questions like trade liberalization. POTUS speeches also have wide viewership and thus can 
make free trade and/or protectionism salient in the minds of voters.100 President Trump here presents 
trade consistently in a negative frame triggering a range of biases explored earlier, including loss 
aversion. 
                                                     
100 Using the state of the union sentences data from the “Comparative Agendas Project US”, The Policy Agendas Project at 
the University of Texas at Austin, 2017. www.comparativeagendas.net. Accessed September 26, 2018, we compared 
Trump’s views on trade with those of the preceding presidents. For doing so, we resorted to sentiment analysis methods - 
Natural Language Process for extracting expressions of certain sentiments/emotions/opinions from text. Specifically, we 
took each sentence coded as about “foreign trade”, and measured their sentiment score automatically through a dictionary 
approach using 5 different lexicons/algorithms, and by averaging their scores; cf. Finn Å. Nielsen, 'AFINN-96', Department 
of Informatics and Mathematical Modelling, Technical University of Denmark, 
http://www2.imm.dtu.dk/pubdb/views/publication_details.php?id=5981 2010 (visited 22 July 2019); Minqing Hu and Bing 
Liu, 'Mining and summarizing customer reviews’, in Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD international conference on 
Knowledge discovery and data mining (ACM 2004), 168-177; Saif M. Mohammad and Peter D. Turney, ‘Crowdsourcing 
a Word-Emotion Association Lexicon’, 29 (3) Computational Intelligence 436 (2013); Mathew L. Jockers, ‘Syuzhet: 
Extract Sentiment and Plot Arcs from Text’, https://github.com/mjockers/syuzhet 2015 (visited 22 July 2019); Tyler W. 
Rinker, ‘Sentimentr: Calculate Text Polarity Sentiment’, http://github.com/trinker/sentimentr 2019 (visited 22 July 2019).  
Beyond Rational Choice: International Trade Law and the Behavioral Political Economy of Protectionism 
European University Institute 17 
 
Famously of course, the President also directly interacts with US citizens via Twitter. The time trends 
below suggest an acceleration from 2013 to a spike in his Tweets about trade and/or China since the end 
of 2017, reaching its post-election maxima at around the time of the “Trump Tariffs” in 2018.101 
                                                     
101 We downloaded the population of DJTs tweets from the trump twitter archive (http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/), and 
transformed it into a workable dataset. This dataset covers not only the content and relevant metadata of the tweets of the 
official account of DJT as well as other interesting variables for salience, such as retweets, number of “favorites” etc. We 
coded the tweet type classifications, by resorting to regular expression matching. 
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President Trump’s attempts at directly communicating with Americans on trade-related matters also 
seem to have progressively gained traction. For example, the above-mentioned spike in his Twitter 
activity on trade and/or China has been accompanied by an exponential increase in his Tweet’s 
“retweets” and “favorite” counts by the American public. 
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More targetedly, statistics associated with his Twitter activity are tightly correlated with information 
seeking behavior on trade matters by Americans, which we proxy using Google search engine data for 
the search term “tariffs”102. This seems to be particularly true in areas adversely impacted by trade 
liberalization, such as the so-called “Rust Belt” states (that generally voted Republican during the last 
presidential election) and especially during the period of the “Trump Tariffs” in 2018.103  
 
 
                                                     
102 Search engine data is often used for proxying issue-salience in social science studies. Specifically, google search volumes 
using “google trends” (https://trends.google.com/trends/); see Krzysztof J. Pelc, Googling the WTO: What Search-Engine 
Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions, 67 International Organization 629 (2013). Our data was collected 
using the google trends API. Two datasets were retrieved. A pure time-series data covering the months between 2004 and 
April 2019 and a geographic dataset covering the campaign/office period (2014 to April 2019). Both measuring search 
volume for the search term “tariffs”. Google search volume measurement are scaled on a range of 0 to 100 based on a 
search term’s proportion to all other search terms used in the United States between 2004/2014 and 2019. 
103 In a similar vein, evidence shows that President Trump’s consistent “China bashing” in his tweets and speeches won him 
votes in the areas most affected by outsourcing to China. A county-level analysis published in December 2016 found that 
a one-point increase in import competition from China ws associated with a 2.9% increase in support for Mr Trump relative 
to earlier Republications. Niall Ferguson and Xiang Xu, ‘Trump and the “Chimerica” Crisis’ The Wall Street Journal (6 
May 2018) (https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-and-the-chimerica-crisis-1525635323, visited 20 September 2019). 
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The manner in which these trade and security-focused China articles/tweets has dominated news media 
and voter perceptions can be contrasted with coverage on technology issues. Economists argue that 
technological change – both informatic and in terms of automation - is a more important source of 
decline of manufacturing employment and dislocation effects than trade and trade agreements.104 But 
the stickiness of this principled claim is weakened by the recency, visibility and style of media coverage 
on these different phenomena. Job displacement is rarely the singular focus of media attention on 
technological developments which tend to emphasise the consumer benefits. Populists too rarely 
campaign directly against technology or automation. If anything, media attention on the negative effects 
associated with technological shifts focus now far more so on privacy concerns than job displacement. 
Globalization (particularly trade from China) is a phenomenon that is far more visible (including to 
political actors) than patterns of technological change and thus much easier to blame for transition 
challenges. In turn, the costs ascribed to economic globalization can be easily turned into political fodder 
by anti-market, anti-elite political movements that span the political spectrum.105  
d. Fairness and Equity in Trade Policy 
Fairness concerns have also been explored in trade theory. Experimental studies explore voter behavior 
if provided with more information about how trade barriers affect the distribution of income. 
Distributional cues generate two opposing effects. While they make people more likely to express self-
serving policy preferences, they also make people more sensitive to the interests of others. In one study 
both reactions were evident, but selfish responses outweighed altruistic ones. Thus, if people knew more 
about the distributional effects of trade, the correlation between personal interests and policy preferences 
would tighten. The explanatory power of economic self-interest depends therefore on beliefs about 
causality.106  
It can also be shown that lower-earning and less-skilled intensive industries tend to receive relatively 
high levels of trade protection. Indeed, this pattern of protection holds across countries with vastly 
different economic and political characteristics. One possible explanation is individual inequity aversion 
leads to systematic differences in support for trade protection across industries. Survey experiments in 
                                                     
104 Bernard Hoekman and Douglas Nelson, above n 73, 32.  
105 With an instructive example, see Joost Pauwelyn, Andrew Guzman and Jennifer Hillman, International Trade Law, 3rd ed. 
(Köln: Wolters Kluwer 2016) 12f. 
106 See Rho and Tomz, above n 70. 
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China and the United States provide strong evidence that individual policy opinions about sector-
specific trade protection depend on the earnings of workers in the sector.107  
Behavioural analysis on ideas surrounding fairness also helps us understand better why particular 
groups (beyond those who lose in economic terms) are likely to support protectionism. Subjects in 
experiments do not engage in simple “pocketbook” voting on trade issues (as rationalist theories predict) 
but are more likely to take into account perceived sociotropic effects of trade on their community.108 
Trade protectionism is also closely linked to out-group aversion such that individuals who are averse to 
out-groups (including foreigners) are less favorable to free trade and inclined to deny the benefits of 
trade agreements to out-group members.109 In a similar vein, Grossman and Helpmann (leading 
proponents of the classic political economy account of trade) now candidly acknowledge that “interest 
groups do not seem to have played a central part” in the dramatic reversal of trade attitudes and trade 
policies.110 Drawing on social psychology, they also explore the notion that voter’s preferences over 
trade policy reflect not only their material self-interest but concerns for members of those groups in 
society with whom they identify.111 Fairness concerns and altruism are thus particular to other members 
of the group, since individuals predominantly care about the well-being of those they perceive to be 
similar to themselves. Interestingly, they find that populist revolutions in which the working class 
repudiates its identification with a broad national group that includes the elites and opts instead to 
identify more narrowly (only with other non-elites) leads to an increased demand for protectionism.112 
Whereas classic trade theory looks at the utility of a nation as a whole, this may thus have shifted in 
voters’ perception to their in-group. Critically under their model, the trigger event in this shift in 
identification is a widening of income distribution, “no matter whether that has been caused by 
globalization, by technological change or by some other mechanism”.113 This connects back to the rising 
inequality within countries leading to loss aversion as discussed above. 
The inequity aversion and sense of fairness may also play in between countries. The purported 
unfairness of current trade agreements has been extensively highlighted by President Trump, not only 
concerning China114 but also NAFTA and EU partners.115 Even the reactions of trading partners are 
framed as unfair.116 Here we encounter a sharp difference with public discourse in the U.S vis-à-vis the 
EU. Populism too has infected European policy discussions, especially on issues of migration. Yet 
                                                     
107 Xiaobo Lü, Kenneth Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, 'Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade 
Protection', 56 American Journal of Political Science 638 (2012). 
108 Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz, ‘Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics and Out-Group 
Anxiety’, 63 (3) International Organization 425 (2009). 
109 Ibid.  
110 Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, ‘Identity Politics and Trade Policy’, NBER Working Paper 25348, p. 1 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w25348 (2018), 1. To be sure, identity is not a new notion in economics, starting with George 
A. Akerlof and Rachel E Kranton, ‘Economics and Identity’, 115(3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 715 (2000). 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid., p. 28. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Trump Tweet: “China has been taking out massive amounts of money & wealth from the U.S. in totally one-sided trade 
but won't help with North Korea. Nice!», January, 2nd, 2017, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/816068355555815424 
115 Trump Tweet: „Mexico has taken advantage of the U.S. for long enough. Massive trade deficits…“, 27.01.2017, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/824970003153842176; « The U.S. has a 60 billion dollar trade deficit with 
Mexico. It has been a one-sided deal from the beginning of NAFTA with massive numbers...”, January 26th, 2017, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/824615820391305216. 
116 Trump Tweet, “Harley Davidson has struggled with Tariffs with the EU, currently paying 31%. They’ve had to move 
production overseas to try and offset some of that Tariff that they’ve been hit with which will rise to 66% in June of 2021.” 
@MariaBartiromo So unfair to U.S. We will Reciprocate!”, April, 23rd, 2019. 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1120644639311134720. 
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European populism does seem to be crudely anti-trade of the sort so visible in the U.S nor does it (yet) 
target select countries like China. Of course, Trump’s tariffs are likely to be perceived as “unfair” by 
those against whom they are imposed, possibly leading to recursive dynamics that trigger support for 
protectionism across borders even by the EU. Key domestic groups will support retaliating and standing 
up for national interests when another country raises tariffs unilaterally.117 But it is other aspects of 
economic globalization and their legal manifestations – especially austerity policies within the Eurozone 
and investor-state dispute settlement in bilateral investment treaties – that are particularly controversial 
in European discourse. Few European populist politicians and their political parties openly advocate 
trade barriers as seen in the U.S context. In fact, the advocates of BREXIT offer free trade as one of the 
claimed benefits of exit from the EU, arguing that it would allow them to pursue deeper levels of 
liberalization through FTAs with third countries. Pointedly, some have suggested that this variance in 
populist discourse is attributable to the far stronger social protections and welfare provisions in 
Europe.118  
Openness to trade in the European setting has always been directly accompanied by far greater 
redistribution and social insurance. From an individual’s perspective, knowing that those at risk of 
unemployment or in unemployment fall into a social safety net (as is mostly the case in Europe) may 
reduce the inequity aversion and thus loss aversion. In fact, more than two thirds of citizens in the EU 
think that the EU has benefited their country, with a rising tendency over the last 10 years (though with 
only 60% of UK citizens agreeing with this statement).119 Indeed, the reasons mentioned for this are the 
economic gains as well as new work opportunities.120 The policy debates within the EU do not therefore 
put into question the value of freedom of movement of goods, services or even capital. The large 
majority of EU citizens have a sense of togetherness in that they think more unites Europe than separates 
it and since the BREXIT vote, this has surged in the other EU member states.121 The key policy debates 
within the EU are instead centered around freedom of movement of persons (particularly in the U.K) or 
irregular patterns of migration. Somewhat ironically, the European opposition to immigration and 
refugees is driven, in part, by concern of erosion in greater access to social benefits. But it offers (even 
if arguably still insufficient) social benefit security to workers affected by job displacement, whether 
induced by trade or other causal factors like technology, avoiding the type of inequity aversion possibly 
at play in the American policy context.  
V. Conclusion and Outlook 
Although some research exists, behavioral political economy in the domain of trade is still in its infancy. 
Our goal in this paper was to highlight targeted psychological analysis to better understand why current 
trade policy has become more protectionist in some countries, especially the U.S. This is not to suggest 
that all of these insights are at play in every setting and thus offer perfect explanatory or predictive 
value.122 Indeed, in other geopolitical constellations (such as in the EU), factors such as security framing 
                                                     
117 We would like to thank one reviewer for this observation.  
118 See Rodrik, above n 27, at 6. 
119 DG Communication, United Kingdom, Socio-demographic trendlines - EP Eurobarometer (2007-2018), Edition 4 (Octobe 
r 2018), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/de/be-heard/eurobarometer/socio-demographic-
trends-in-national-public-opinion-edition-4, (visited 6 May 2019), at 12 and 16. 
120 Flash Eurobarometer, Report, Emotions and Political Engagement Towards the EU, 25th April 2019, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2019/emotions-and-political-engagement-
towards-the-eu/report/en-flash-2019.pdf (visited 6 May 2019), at 12. 
121 Flash Eurobarometer, Report, Emotions and Political Engagement Towards the EU, 25th April 2019, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2019/emotions-and-political-engagement-
towards-the-eu/report/en-flash-2019.pdf (visited 6 May 2019), at 12. 
122 Consider for instance the variable of market power and size. The US is a relatively closed economy (in the sense that much 
of its output is geared to domestic production and consumption) and therefore may in fact not lose as much from 
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on trade have historically led to to greater integration instead of economic nationalism. Behavioral 
political economy of trade does not per se predict which way policy preferences will ultimately run. In 
order to make country-specific predictions, an additional set of scope conditions would need to be 
defined and applied, not least history, dependency on international markets, perceptions of country or 
industry status (rising or declining) and whether a given state has a well developed social security system 
or an efficient system of redistribution.  
But generally speaking, behavioral insights are under-explored variables in trade law scholarship 
which are potentially highly relevant to understanding current trade policy in some states, especially as 
they sharply call into question some of the rigid assumptions of the classic political economy account 
which has hitherto informed international trade law. These sorts of psychological biases and heuristics 
can provide templates for patterns of conduct in complex settings. Of course, these psychological kinks 
have always been with us including in past periods of benign or supportive policies on trade. The 
difference now may be one of critical mass in that geopolitical and distributional constellations have 
changed in such a way that key politicians play on certain biases, consciously or otherwise. 
Loss aversion is certainly probative in understanding the growth of protectionism and levels of voter 
support for such policies in the U.S. The Trump Administration has consistently invoked a double loss 
frame of the role of trade in the U.S, painting it as both an individual loss for working Americans 
(through trade-induced labor displacement feeding into fairness concerns surrounding growing levels of 
inequality within the U.S) and as a national loss for the U.S as a country (given rising levels of equality 
between the U.S and other countries such as China). The behavioural consequences of the double loss 
bias have been accelerated even further by the active deployment of a negative security frame in debates 
surrounding trade policy. The aggressive notion that broad patterns of trade now threaten the national 
security of the U.S is the most unprecedented departure from past American understandings of the trade 
and the international trade law system. These changes (largely Trump-induced) have seemingly made 
Americans more protectionist and risk acceptant to U.S entry into trade wars. Principled and empirical 
objections pointing to the causative contribution of other factors (such as technology-induced labor 
displacement) are likely to have little traction in policy debates given availability bias and the aggressive 
negative framing of trade through conventional media intermediaries and powerful new modalities of 
social media such as Twitter. Indeed, this direct channel of communication between politicians and 
voters may necessitate trade theory to rethink the role of lobbying in trade policy. 
International economic lawyers should be aware that trade is now inherently more vulnerable as a 
policy agenda. Legal structures in trade law need to be re-orientated away from a rational choice account 
(on which they are currently premised) to better reflect the vulnerabilities highlighted by a behavioral 
economy analysis. Most importantly, we can no longer separate international trade law from larger 
debates around globalization or domestic policy especially on questions of inequality and social 
inclusion measures. To be sure, the national plane would seem to be the primary focus of dealing with 
current deficiencies which are conducive to exploiting biases and heuristics of voters.123 Patterns of 
inequality that can bleed into fairness concerns raise complex questions of the appropriate levels of a 
social safety net as well retraining and employment opportunities. The aggressive unilateralism of 
deployment of tariffs by the U.S Executive also raises a question of the sufficiency of veto points/players 
                                                     
protectionist policies. This is not the case for most countries in the world that have to specialize and thus export if they 
want to increase per capita incomes (or sustain them), with the latter offering an external constraint on resort to protectionist 
policies. 
123 Bounded rationality is of course also a constitutional rather than only an economic and trade policy problem requiring 
inclusive, constitutional restraints (e.g. prescribing non-discriminatory competition rules, ‘protection balance sheets’ 
publicly justifying redistributive economic legislation, legal and judicial remedies of adversely affected citizens, structural 
adjustment assistance rules): see for details Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), National Constitutions and 
International Economic Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993); Heinz Hauser and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), International 
Competition Rules in the GATT/WTO System, Special Issue of the Swiss Review of International Economic Relations 
(1994). 
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as a matter of U.S law and domestic law reform.124 International trade law too must play its part. Current 
WTO disciplines, such as in the Agreement on Agriculture or the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, should not act as a constraint on domestic social inclusion measures.125 Of 
course, properly interpreted, existing WTO law can support legitimate domestic measures which are 
necessary for social inclusion and poverty reduction by respecting them under GATT Article XX(a).126 
Legal imagination though can and should extend beyond existing WTO norms, identifying and 
diagnosing reform models to build sustainable levels of public support for international disciplines on 






                                                     
124 On veto points/players, see George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003).  
125 Request for consultation Australia and Brazil, India - Measures Concerning Sugar and Sugarcane, WT/DS579/1 and 
WT/DS580/1, March 5th, 2019.  
126 Gillian, A Moon, ‘Fundamental Moral Imperative’: Social Inclusion, the Sustainable Development Goals and International 
Trade Law After Brazil-Taxation, 52 Journal of World Trade 995 (2018). 
127 See, e.g., Gregory C. Shaffer, ‘Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion’ (2019) (1) University of Illinois Law 
Review 1; David Trubek, Chantal Thomas and Alvaro Santos, ‘World Trade and Investment Law in a Time of Crisis: 
Distribution, Development and Social Protection’, University of Wisconsin Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series No. 1470 (2019). 
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